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Abstract: The Paris Agreement has been celebrated as a breakthrough for international climate 
policy. However, relatively scant attention has been given to the emergent ecosystem of climate 
finance facilities that support it. We provide an overview of the rising number of climate-related 
trust funds at multilateral development banks (MDBs). These funds can be distinguished into 
mitigation funds and adaptation funds. Some funds have a focus on capacity building activities. 
To maximize their effect on sustainable development, the different types of funds should follow 
different resource allocation criteria: For adaptation funds, vulnerability should represent the 
primary criterion. For mitigation funds, the main criterion should be the emission reduction 
potential. Capacity building should primarily focus on countries with weak institutions. Using a 
novel dataset of disbursements of climate-related trust funds, available for the World Bank, we 
examine whether fund allocations correspond to these expectations, and compare them with those 
of bilateral donors. We find that while trust funds with a focus on mitigation generally allocate aid 
in line with efficiency considerations, trust funds with a focus on adaptation do not seem to 
prioritize the countries most strongly in need, contrary to bilateral aid. Furthermore, capacity 
building activities do not seem to focus on countries with weak institutions. These findings have 
important implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy of climate aid to developing countries. 
Keywords: climate change; trust funds; multilateral development banks; World Bank; aid 
allocation; mitigation; adaptation; capacity building 
 
1. Introduction 
The Paris Agreement has been celebrated as a breakthrough for international climate policy. 
However, relatively scant attention has been given to the emergent ecosystem of climate finance 
facilities that support it. Mirroring the complexity of the climate governance regime complex [1–4], 
the international climate finance architecture is complex and includes several funding channels, 
such as bi- and multilateral aid, bi- and multilateral finance channeled through multilateral trust 
funds, private finance through international market mechanisms, and hybrid forms of those [5–7]. 
In this paper, we provide an overview of the rising number of climate-related trust funds at 
multilateral development banks (MDBs). Over the past two decades, MDBs have created over 200 
of such trust funds. Most trust funds receive contributions directly from donors, while others 
receive funding from so-called financial intermediary funds (FIFs), like the Global Environment 
Facility [8,9], which themselves are replenished periodically by donor governments. Primarily 
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through project grants, trust funds can usefully complement other activities that support 
developing countries with their contributions to global climate change mitigation, and in their effort 
to adapt to the consequences of climate change. As opposed to most traditional climate finance, 
which is relatively well documented through data collected on Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), information on MDB trust funds 
rests mainly within these banks. Information publicly available is patchy and incomplete [10,11]. 
Based on both publicly available data and information received directly by the banks, including 
interpretations based on numerous staff interviews, the overview we provide substantially 
increases the knowledge about the role and activities of these funds and thus of a significant, but 
yet underexplored, phenomenon within climate finance. 
Beyond the overview of MDB trust funds, we provide an empirical assessment of the 
allocation of their financial resources to developing countries, which is based on a normative 
framework sketched at the beginning of this paper. 
Our work draws upon several existing strands of the literature. Normative arguments are 
based on the general aid allocation literature distinguishing between allocation criteria that are 
theoretically promising for effective aid (such as aid allocation oriented at recipient need) and those 
that are not (allocation oriented at donor interest). This large literature goes back to the 1970s 
[12,13]. Its implications in terms of aid effectiveness are not only theoretically plausible, but have 
also been empirically confirmed in later studies [14,15]. 
Recent work has shown, however, that this conceptual framework is not applicable to aid for 
global public goods such as climate change mitigation [16]. This is because, for global public goods, 
the benefits are independent of the locality of project implementation [1,2]. No matter where a ton 
of CO2 is reduced, a vulnerable country like Bangladesh will benefit from these emission reductions 
in exactly the same way. Hence, what should matter here to determine the locality of 
implementation is not recipient need, but the efficiency of the investment, so that a maximum of 
emission reductions can be reached with any given amount of financial resources. Of course, 
emission reduction measures may also have some positive local co-benefits. Furthermore, MDBs 
could assist developing countries to become locations for more efficient mitigation, notably through 
capacity building. Such capacity building is an important component of enhancing readiness to 
engage in mitigation [11]. 
In contrast to mitigation funding, adaptation funding—through trust funds or otherwise—
should be allocated in response to recipient vulnerability [17–20]. In contrast, mitigation funding 
should flow primarily to those places where it can achieve the greatest benefits in terms of 
emissions reductions. This is usually not in the poorest countries, as they lack mitigation options, 
but rather in middle income countries that often face critical junctures regarding their mid-term 
development strategies (e.g., regarding investments in infrastructure or durable consumer goods 
like vehicles, refrigerators or housing) [17,20,21]. Obviously, this only holds on average, and there 
may always be exceptions. In particular, in certain poor countries there might be the risk that 
satisfying “suppressed demand” would lead to a big rise of emissions. In this case, mitigation could 
be achieved, if a new, proposed high carbon infrastructure is prevented by an alternative, low 
carbon investment. For example, if Tanzania plans to invest in a new coal power plant, a trust fund 
could intervene at the decision-making point with a renewable energy alternative. However, such 
windows of opportunity are only open for very short periods and are difficult to predict. 
The geographic distribution of projects under the clean development mechanism (CDM), an 
international market mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, demonstrates where these efficient 
mitigation locations can be found: until May 2020, 75.2% of all emission credits (certified emission 
reductions, CERs) expected before the end of 2020 were linked to projects in only three countries 
(China, India and Brazil) [22]. At the same time, donors are under increased pressure to focus on 
poor recipients in their traditional development cooperation, as enshrined in their commitments to 
principles of “good donorship,” for instance in the Paris Declaration, and as monitored by the 
international community through various donor rankings [23–25]. Some donors may not be aware 
of the differences between different types of aid and thus follow the same principles for all aid. 
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Others may find it difficult to explain these differences to the public, and hence, give in to the 
pressure even where it is misguided. As a result, many bilateral aid agencies have found it difficult 
to use completely different, efficiency-oriented targeting criteria for climate change mitigation [16]. 
Our study will examine to what extent MDBs face similar tradeoffs in allocating trust fund 
resources, or whether they are able to allocate mitigation finance more efficiently. 
While investing mitigation finance in places with no efficient mitigation options is simply a 
waste of resources, the MDBs’ activities should not compete with a functioning private market, 
either [11,26]. This represents a dilemma if MDBs nevertheless decide to remain active in this area, 
as has been the case in carbon markets. How can they contribute to climate change mitigation, 
avoiding both inefficiency and the crowding out of the private sector? As acknowledged in their 
own policy documents, they have to focus on an enabling role, e.g., [27]. Apart from providing 
conceptual inputs regarding the development and expansion of the markets and the piloting of new 
activities, they can adopt a complementary role by focusing on capacity building and governance, 
thereby increasing the scope of efficient mitigation options. 
Questions regarding the purpose of trust funds and of their complementarities to alternative 
funding instruments are also at the center of the broader literature on multi-bi aid, i.e., development 
assistance originating from bilateral donors, but channeled through trust funds at multilateral 
agencies. The use of multi-bi aid has grown tremendously since its inception at the turn of the 
millennium, with a value that currently comes close to half of multilateral aid [28]. Prior studies 
have established that aid channeled through such trust funds often focuses on different (sub-) 
sectors than other development assistance, or on different recipients, such as countries just 
emerging from major conflicts, where support may be very valuable, but also very risky, e.g., [29–
31]. In this paper, however, we consider a given sector (climate change mitigation and adaptation), 
which is both extremely prominent in multi-bi aid, but also well represented within traditional bi- 
and multilateral aid. Furthermore, at least for mitigation funding, it is difficult to imagine a specific 
focus on conflict areas. So, the question remains; which complementarities could justify the 
existence of the many MDB trust funds active in this area? 
Specific studies focusing on climate-related MDB trust funds are rare. Yet, there is some initial 
work on individual trust funds, notably on the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) [32–34], 
and on the development of carbon funds at the World Bank [26], on which we can build with our 
analysis. In this paper, we go beyond a discussion of the climate and carbon finance architecture 
and seek to understand the actual resource allocation patterns of MDB trust funds. Based on a 
unique database with information we collected from different MDBs, our work also provides an 
important context analysis for the interpretation of prior case studies in this area. 
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data collection process and our main data 
sources. In Section 3, we first provide a general overview of the landscape of climate-related trust 
funds before examining to what extent they allocate their resources in accordance with mitigation 
and adaptation purposes. Section 4 discusses the findings and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Materials and Methods 
The information used in this paper was collected in the framework of an assessment of the 
landscape of the MDBs’ climate trust funds on behalf of the German Agency for International 
Cooperation (GIZ) [35]. Thanks to the relentless efforts by the commissioning agency, we were able 
to create a dataset that—while still far from complete—goes way beyond the sketchy data publicly 
available. This dataset includes general information, including the start and end year, the 
geographic and thematic focus, and total contributions for all climate-related trust funds at the 
World Bank (specifically, at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD, the 
International Development Agency, IDA, and the International Finance Corporation, IFC), the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB). The initial list of relevant funds was obtained using a key word search 
(i.e., climate, mitigation, green, ozone, carbon, emissions, environment, forest, clean technology, 
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Kyoto, adaptation) on trust fund titles in the MDBs’ annual reports, which was then reviewed by 
experts, notably GIZ and MDB staff. Table 1 provides an overview of the available information: 
Table 1. Overview of climate-related Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs) and multilateral 
development bank (MDB) trust funds. 
Institution 
Number of Trust 
Funds 
Number of 
Programs 
Size (Million 
US$) 
FIFs 12 12 33,777 
World Bank 161 100 6358 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) 22 19 1216 
Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) 
15 15 726 
African Development Bank (AfDB) 6 6 316 
Total 216 152 42,393 
Notes: Numbers reflect complete records but are over different time periods, subject to data 
availability: FIFs (1991–2019), World Bank (1992–2019), ADB (2001–2019), IADB (1998–2019), AfDB 
(2008–2019). The numbers also include funds that are not active anymore. Moreover, ‘Programs’ 
refers to a categorization introduced by the authors to regroup trust funds focusing on the same 
topic, such as several trust funds succeeding each other based on a very similar agenda, or trust 
funds that are separate only due to specific administrative requirements of some of their funders. 
Source: [35] (20). 
One difficulty in presenting the data is to distinguish independent trust funds from the myriad 
of auxiliary and supplementary funds that appear as separate entities in the MDBs’ trust fund 
databases, and to avoid double counting if the resources of one trust fund are channeled through 
others (child funds) or accounted for separately by banks acting as implementing agencies. The 
MDBs themselves do not provide clear guidance on what should be counted. We define trust funds 
based on the following criteria: 
 They receive own external donor contributions (or are at least meant to do so), i.e., they do 
not just receive funding as implementers, allocated to them from a higher-level trust fund. 
(Yet, for the illustration from an MDB perspective, we sometimes highlight the 
implementing accounts separately, e.g., in Table 2 below.) 
 We exclude administrative and holding funds, but include facilities that encompass 
different sub-funds if those facilities can receive own external donor funding. 
 We include second-phase trust funds as separate trust funds, no matter whether there were 
any substantive foreseen changes in the activities. 
Table 2. Top-ten trust funds at MDBs. 
 Trust Fund Name 
Trust Fund 
Size 1 
World Bank 
1 Global Environment Facility Trust Fund 2 2320.7 
2 First Tranche of the Umbrella Carbon Facility 833.7 
3 Strategic Climate Fund 2 597.9 
4 Carbon Fund of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 593.0 
5 Readiness Fund of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 315.5 
6 Transformative Carbon Asset Facility 212.2 
7 Prototype Carbon Fund 206.1 
8 Third Tranche of the BioCarbon Fund (BioCFT3) 204.6 
9 Carbon Fund of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 200.5 
10 Multi Donor Trust Fund for Mainstreaming Disaster Reduction Initiative of the 199.2 
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Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 
Asian Development Bank 
1 Clean Technology Fund 2 490.2 
2 Strategic Climate Fund 2 243.9 
3 Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia (CFPS) II 149.5 
4 Urban Climate Change Resilience Trust Fund (UCCRTF) 149.4 
5 Global Environment Facility Trust Fund 2 135.1 
6 Clean Energy Fund (CEF) 122.0 
7 Future Carbon Fund 115.0 
8 Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia (CFPS) I 77.8 
9 Climate Change Fund 74.0 
10 Carbon Capture and Storage Fund (CCSF) 70.9 
Inter-American Development Bank 
1 Clean Technology Fund 2 346.9 
2 Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in the Americas (C2F) 249.5 
3 OC-SDP for Sustainability II 207.7 
4 Global Environment Facility Trust Fund 2 203.0 
5 Strategic Climate Fund 2 140.8 
6 UK Sustainable Infrastructure Program 68.9 
7 Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Initiative (SECCI) 55.3 
8 Biodiversity/Natural Capital Lab 25.0 
9 UK Low Carbon Agriculture to Avoid Deforestation Fund 22.3 
10 Colombia Sostenible 21.7 
African Development Bank 3 
1 Clean Technology Fund 2 388.6 
2 Strategic Climate Fund 2 137.0 
3 Sustainable Energy for Africa (SEFA) 106.0 
4 Least Developed Countries Fund2 60.2 
5 Global Environment Facility Trust Fund 2 36.7 
6 Clim-dev Africa Fund (CDSF) 27.1 
7 Africa Climate Change Fund (ACCF) 12.7 
8 Special Climate Change Fund 2 5.5 
9 Adaptation Fund 2 4.5 
1 Trust fund size refers to cumulative contributions in million USD since inception, with different 
coverage periods across MDBs: World Bank (fiscal years 2000–2019), ADB (2001–2019), IADB (1998–
2019), AfDB (2010–2019). See exception for implementing accounts below. 2 Rather than autonomous 
trust funds, these funds are implementing accounts under FIFs for which the MDB is an 
implementing agency. Associated size refers to total receipts by the MDB in 2009–2018. 3 The nine 
funds listed reflect the entire set of AfDB trust funds (3) and FIF implementing accounts (6). 
For each MDB, Table 2 provides the list of the largest active climate-related trust funds in 
terms of their cumulative contributions received over the lifetime of the fund. Since the MDBs’ 
implementing accounts under the FIFs are often even larger than their own autonomous trust 
funds, we also include them in Table 2 for illustrative purposes. The size of FIFs is so large because 
a number of them operate as financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC, or as parts of the explicit 
“umbrella” of the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs). While FIF implementing accounts dominate for 
many regional development banks, the World Bank holds a portfolio of sizeable autonomous trust 
funds for which it raises its funds directly with donors. 
We further classified all climate-related trust funds according to their substantive link to 
climate change. These classifications are based on literature and document reviews, keyword 
search, internet searches, and expert interviews. First, in parallel to the DAC Rio Markers’ 
distinction between climate change as a ‘principal’ or merely a ‘significant’ objective of bilateral aid, 
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we differentiate between high and medium relevance of the trust funds in addressing climate 
change. 
High relevance: trust funds with a direct focus on climate change (e.g., carbon funds, whose goal 
is to support development of international market mechanisms for climate change mitigation and to 
generate emission credits that can be used under such mechanisms, or general climate change 
mitigation or adaptation funds linked to public climate finance provision, e.g., in the context of the 
GEF or the GCF). 
Medium relevance: trust funds with indirect focus on climate change (e.g., renewable energy or 
energy efficiency funds, whose goal is to replace carbon-intensive economic activity with low-
emission alternatives; these funds may generate substantial or even dominant co-benefits in other 
areas). 
Second, we classify trust funds based on the type of climate change-related interventions: 
Mitigation: trust funds seeking to prevent climate change through the reduction or avoidance 
of greenhouse gas emissions. They include carbon funds, funds focusing on renewable energy and 
energy efficiency, funds focusing on forestry activities, and various combinations of these activities. 
Adaptation: trust funds seeking to address/mitigate the impact of climate change. They include 
a large number of funds specifically focusing on disaster prevention and response, but also some 
funds focusing on other activities, e.g., water management. 
Climate change general: trust funds that address both mitigation and adaptation. 
Figure 1 presents the development of the number of active funds in each of these areas over 
time (including trust funds of both high and medium relevance). Colors indicate main areas (blue: 
mitigation, orange: adaptation, grey: general), while different shapes refer to thematic sub-fields. 
Apart from the strong rise in the number of climate-related trust funds overall, the data show the 
dominance of carbon funds, but also of climate-related funds whose focus is not fixed to any single 
purpose and include both mitigation and adaptation activities. 
 
Figure 1. Number of active trust funds, by fiscal year and thematic orientation. Note: The figure 
includes all trust funds for which information on the start and the end year was available. This 
notably excludes all 21 trust funds of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The definition of 
‘fiscal years’ differs between the World Bank and FIFs (1 July to 30 June), and the other MDBs, for 
which they align with calendar years. We ignore these differences here to avoid unnecessary 
complexity in the presentation. 
While general information at the trust fund level are available for all MDBs, we lack detailed 
information about individual trust fund-supported projects across MDBs. Maximizing the available 
information, we therefore conduct analyses at two levels. At the trust fund level, we exploit 
information on trust fund features to infer to what extent these funds cater to climate-related needs. 
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Specifically, we examine whether trust funds are legally restricted as to the types of locations they 
can assist. While the advantage of this approach is that such information is available for all MDB 
trust funds, its drawback is that this information may be a poor representation of actual allocations. 
At the project level, we compare the allocation of MDB trust fund resources to the aid 
allocation by bilateral DAC donors, as far as data availability allows us to do. In fact, additional 
information on actual disbursements, recipient countries, and sectoral allocation is available only 
for the World Bank. The information covers both the World Bank’s autonomous trust funds and 
those parts of FIFs for which the World Bank is an implementing agency. Over the fiscal year 2009–
18 period, the World Bank was an implementing agency for the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
and its two associated trust funds, the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), the Strategic Climate Fund 
(SCF), the Adaptation Fund, the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS), the Guyana 
REDD+ Investment Fund, and the Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change 
Mitigation. However, the disaggregated information does not cover Bank-executed trust funds, i.e., 
trust funds that finance the Bank’s own support services, such as activities in the area of knowledge 
transfer, advisory services and technical assistance. Moreover, finally, carbon trust funds, as well as 
IFC funds, are systematically excluded due to special confidentiality policies. In the case of IFC 
trust funds, this omission is relatively unproblematic, as IFC manages only 21 trust funds on 
climate change, with comparatively small funding volumes involved. Our main dataset for the 
purpose of analyzing disbursement patterns includes trust funds at the World Bank in the period of 
fiscal years 2009–2018 (the World Bank’s fiscal year 2018 ends on 30 June 2018), excluding carbon 
funds, bank-executed funds, and IFC trust funds. 
We complement these trust fund data with DAC disbursement data for adaptation and 
mitigation (as identified by the DAC’s ‘Rio markers’). DAC bilateral aid is a useful reference point, 
as it represents the alternative financing tool that donors can use, and through which they also 
provide significant funding for climate-related purposes [36]. At the same time, we would not 
expect bilateral aid to be allocated in accordance with efficiency criteria, given the available 
evidence on strategic uses of aid [14,15,37,38]. Furthermore, channeling aid through MDB trust 
funds could allow donors to escape the public pressure mentioned above, and to spend mitigation 
resources more efficiently. The allocation patterns of bilateral DAC donors should thus provide a 
lower bar against which MDB trust funds should be able to fare better. 
To compare the funding allocations of World Bank trust funds and bilateral DAC donors, we 
construct a panel dataset of 145 recipients in 2009–2018—in line with the standard approach taken 
by aid allocation studies [12,13,39]. In this setting, we analyze the effect of different indicators of 
climate vulnerability and mitigation efficiency on funding from mitigation or adaptation related 
trust funds, and respectively bilateral DAC donors. We also include generally accessible recipient-
level control variables. Appendix A provides information on all variables and data sources.  
In estimating the aid allocation models, we implement the analysis and reorganize the 
disbursement data to obtain a recipient-year panel dataset. Furthermore, we must take into account 
the censored nature of the data (many country-years with zero disbursements) by using Tobit 
models. A Tobit model posits that realized disbursements are based on an underlying latent utility, 
whereby the donor only allocates funding when the utility is positive, and the funding is greater as 
utility grows further. Coefficient estimates from a Tobit model thus reflect the combination of (1) 
the change in disbursements for recipients, weighted by the probability of receiving positive 
amounts, and (2) the change in probability receiving disbursements, weighted by the expected 
value of a positive disbursement. They can be directly interpreted in terms of the changes in donor 
utility. 
3. Results 
3.1. Analysis of Geographic Allocation Based on Trust Fund Features 
As discussed in Section 1, adaptation aid should be provided to those countries most in need, 
because this is where it can have the greatest effect. Except for a few individual funds specifically 
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dedicated to an individual recipient, at trust fund level, we cannot use country specific information 
to assess recipient need. However, we can proxy need by poverty and examine if trust funds cater 
for IDA eligible countries. Eligibility for IDA support depends primarily on per capita income, i.e., 
a country’s gross national income (GNI) per capita must be below a specific threshold (US$ 1175 in 
fiscal year 2020). In exceptional cases, IDA eligibility extends to countries that lack creditworthiness 
despite a higher income (including a number of small island states). Other countries borrow from 
the IBRD. In a certain transition phase, countries may also be able to borrow from both (blend 
countries) [40]. 
We can thus use the categories IDA, IBRD, or blend, to assess—albeit roughly—the need 
orientation of climate-related trust funds. For MDBs other than the World Bank, however, we lack 
this differentiation. Even many of the World Bank’s own funds are not clearly defined as part of 
either group. We introduced the additional categories as ‘regional’ and ‘global’ when no other 
information was available, and where funds kept the freedom to allocate their resources anywhere 
they see fit (or within only regional limitations). Table 3 shows that this happens a lot. 
Table 3. Geographic orientation of trust funds. 
 Mitigation 
Trust Funds 
Adaptation 
Trust Funds 
Climate 
Change 
General 
 All climate change trust funds (total: 216) 
Number of trust funds 124 47 45 
of which    
for IDA eligible countries 6% 11% 2% 
for International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) countries 
19% 4% 4% 
for blend countries 2% 6% 2% 
Regional 23% 30% 49% 
Global 51% 49% 42% 
 High relevance for climate change (total: 109) 
Number of trust funds 64 16 29 
of which    
for IDA eligible countries 3.1% 31.3% 3.4% 
for IBRD countries 4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
for blend countries 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 
Regional 17.2% 31.3% 48.3% 
Global 75.0% 37.5% 44.8% 
Note: Information on commitments for individual funds is too sketchy for a value-weighted 
presentation of these numbers. 
Table 3 also shows the same distinction for mitigation funds and mixed funds (climate change 
general). The distribution for the latter is hard to interpret, because it includes the highest share of 
regional development banks (ADB, AfDB, IADB), whose trust funds fall invariably in the category 
‘regional’. 
The information on mitigation related trust funds is more revealing, however. In line with the 
consideration that climate change mitigation is usually not very efficient in the poorest countries, 
there are hardly any mitigation trust funds focusing exclusively on IDA eligible recipients. In the 
second part of the table that considers only those trust funds that fully focus on climate change 
related activities (‘high relevance’), these are only 3% (as opposed to 31% for adaptation trust 
funds). This contrasts strongly with the result by Castro et al. [16] for bilateral donors, whose 
geographic allocation of mitigation aid remains strongly influenced by the allocation of their overall 
development assistance. 
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This greater consideration of efficiency concerns by the MDB’s mitigation trust funds may be 
driven by the dominance of carbon funds observed above. Carbon funds differ from other trust 
funds in that the efficiency of their investments directly matters for the individual funders. They 
can use the emission credits generated by these investments to fulfill their national emission 
reduction commitments, and thus their obligations in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol (and 
expect to use them in the context of the Paris Agreement in the future). There is hence a clear 
financial incentive for funders to select efficient locations, and the literature suggests that the World 
Bank at least has taken full advantage of its knowledge in this respect [11,26,41]. In contrast, climate 
finance through bilateral aid or aid channeled through any of the other MDB trust funds does not 
generate emission reduction credits. Furthermore, all resources spent for climate finance can be 
accounted for as ODA, no matter whether they are spent efficiently or not. 
Of course, the issue remains that for most MDB trust funds—those without detailed 
disbursement data—we do not know about the location of their funding. 75% of MDB trust funds 
with a clear focus on mitigation can be active globally, without limitations. Information on 
individual disbursements is required to examine the allocation of their resources. We thus proceed 
with an assessment of these disbursements. 
3.2. Analysis of Trust Fund Allocations Based on Disbursement Data 
This section presents results from a panel analysis comparing allocations of climate-related 
trust funds at the World Bank with those from bilateral DAC donors in 2009–18. Table 4 presents 
the results, first for mitigation (Table 4), then for adaptation (Table 5). In each of these tables, the 
first part considers disbursements by all relevant trust funds, while the second part considers only 
those identified as highly relevant. In each case, the tables also present a comparison to the 
allocation of bilateral ODA with climate change mitigation (Table 4) and adaptation (Table 5). For 
comparison with disbursements of trust funds that are highly relevant for climate change, we 
consider ODA with mitigation or adaptation as its principal objective; for a comparison with 
disbursements of all relevant trust funds, we consider ODA, for which mitigation or adaptation are 
at least a significant objective. In line with Bagchi et al. [18] and the general aid allocation literature, 
we use commitments, rather than disbursements for mitigation and adaptation aid, because they 
better capture the donors’ intent. For MDB trust funds, however, we must rely on disbursements, 
because data on commitments for specific recipients are not available. We control for population in 
all regressions and enter government effectiveness as an additional control in some regressions as a 
robustness test. Our results are qualitatively unaffected when using alternative governance 
indicators, such as regulatory quality or control of corruption, available from the World Bank 
Governance Indicators. 
Table 4. Correlates of disbursements by World Bank mitigation trust funds and bilateral mitigation 
finance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 High or Medium Relevance for Mitigation High Relevance for Mitigation 
 TF-disb. TF-disb. TF-disb. ODA TF-disb. TF-disb. TF-disb. ODA 
GDP per capita −5.23 * −6.59 ** −8.70 ** −1.67 *** −3.35 −7.78 0.62 −2.38 *** 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.51) (0.31) (0.93) (0.00) 
Population 4.58 *** 3.13 * 3.17 * 0.98 *** 2.76 0.52 0.25 1.42 *** 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.07) (0.00) (0.34) (0.89) (0.94) (0.00) 
CERs 0.69* 0.62 0.08 ***  1.53 * 1.52* 0.07 * 
  (0.07) (0.11) (0.00)  (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) 
Gov. effectiveness  6.06 0.72 *   −18.04 2.05 *** 
   (0.28) (0.08)   (0.14) (0.00) 
Observations 1507 1507 1477 1399 1507 1507 1477 1399 
Recipients 145 145 142 142 145 145 142 142 
Censored obs. 1429 1429 1399 114 1490 1490 1460 244 
Log likelihood −481 −479 −479 −3547 −127 −125 −124 −3797 
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AIC 972 971 971 7108 263 262 261 7608 
Notes: Random effects Tobit models. p-values in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.01). Trust 
fund disbursements (TF-disb.), GDP per capita, Population and CERs are in logs so that coefficients 
can be interpreted as elasticities. All right-hand side variables are lagged by one period. TF-disb. is 
available until 30 June 2018 (fiscal year 2018), ODA is available until 30 December 2017. For the sake 
of comparison with bilateral ODA, trust fund disbursements to non-developing countries are 
excluded from the analysis. See Appendix A for a detailed variable description. 
Table 5. Correlates of disbursements by World Bank adaptation trust funds and bilateral adaptation 
finance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 High or Medium Relevance for Adaptation High Relevance for Adaptation 
 TF-disb.TF-disb.TF-disb.TF-disb. ODA ODA TF-disb.TF-disb.TF-disb.TF-disb. ODA ODA. 
GDP per capita −1.51 −7.17 * −7.06 * −7.44 * −3.49 ***−3.56 *** 3.79 8.34 * 5.91 5.62 −5.11 ***−5.41 ***
 (0.50) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.09) (0.39) (0.46) (0.00) (0.00) 
Population 2.74 *** 2.96 *** 2.92 *** −0.21 0.74 *** 1.03 *** 2.94 * 0.27 4.35 ** 0.59 0.90 *** 1.46 *** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.86) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.81) (0.03) (0.79) (0.00) (0.00) 
Land below 5m  0.52 0.49 0.53 −0.04 −0.04  0.07 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.09 
  (0.20) (0.23) (0.16) (0.55) (0.54)  (0.86) (0.88) (0.75) (0.23) (0.29) 
ND-GAIN  0.28 0.13 −0.30 0.17 ** 0.21**  −0.72 −1.68 −2.25 ** 0.22 * 0.30 ** 
  (0.55) (0.83) (0.60) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.21) (0.12) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) 
Gov. effectiveness   2.09 2.86 −0.40 −0.33   18.57 ** 19.89 ** 0.82 1.05 
   (0.65) (0.52) (0.51) (0.60)   (0.03) (0.02) (0.36) (0.26) 
CERs    1.37 *** 0.13 ***     1.71 *** 0.25 ***  
    (0.00) (0.00)     (0.01) (0.00)  
Observations 1507 1133 1133 1133 858 858 1507 1133 1133 1133 859 859 
Recipients 145 109 109 109 109 109 145 109 109 109 109 109 
Censored obs. 1326 978 978 978 77 77 1435 1068 1068 1068 169 169 
Log likelihood −1021 −865 −865 −854 −2106 −2100 −434 −409 −378 −373 −2268 −2277 
AIC 2053 1744 1746 1726 4228 4217 879 832 772 765 4554 4571 
Notes: Random effects Tobit models. p-values in parentheses (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.01). Trust 
fund disbursements (TF-disb.), GDP per capita, Population and CERs are in logs so that coefficients 
can be interpreted as elasticities. All right-hand side variables are lagged by one period. TF-disb. is 
available until 30 June 2018 (fiscal year 2018), ODA is available until 30 December 2017. For the sake 
of comparison with bilateral ODA, trust fund disbursements to non-developing countries are 
excluded from the analysis. See Appendix A for a detailed variable description. 
Table 4 shows that World Bank trust funds tend to allocate their funding in line with both 
poverty criteria—gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is generally negatively linked to 
funding—and efficiency—as measured by the market-based indicator, i.e., the CERs (in tCO2e) 
expected from registered CDM projects. The allocation thereby follows very similar lines as the 
allocation of mitigation-related ODA. While for both variables, the coefficient estimates tend to be 
much higher than for bilateral aid, this is due to the fact that, in a large majority of country-years, 
trust fund disbursements are zero. The large number of zeros implies that the relative change 
reflected in the size of the coefficients (which are elasticities since the variables are in logs) appears 
to be bigger. It also implies that the Tobit for World Bank trust funds captures mostly the binary 
decision whether at all a country should receive funding, and not so much the decision on how 
much it should receive. 
When comparing the left to the right side of the table, it appears that—as opposed to bilateral 
donors—the Bank focused more on efficiency and less on poverty for those activities most clearly 
focused on mitigation. This makes sense, as it is only for activities with a clear global public good 
character that the locality of implementation does not matter. This argument is somewhat diluted 
for activities with multiple objectives, such as those included on the left side of the table. Some local 
co-benefits may be relevant in either case, so that this does not make the comparison less relevant. 
However, the numbers for highly relevant mitigation disbursements by World Bank trust 
funds must be interpreted with a lot of caution. As shown by the number of censored observations 
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below the table, for this category, there are only 17 out of 1507 country-year observations with 
strictly positive values. They refer to just a handful of recipients, namely Brazil (during five years), 
Liberia (during four years), Guyana (during three years), South Africa (during two years), as well as 
Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of Congo (during one year each). The 
lack of variation on the dependent variable leads to a lack of robustness in the estimation results 
(see, e.g., Regression 7 where government effectiveness is introduced as an additional control). To 
be sure, we can thus look directly at the statistics for the countries concerned. They confirm the 
previous discussion: only the Central African Republic and Liberia are low-income countries, the 
other three (with the majority of the disbursements) are middle-income countries—in the case of 
Brazil and South Africa, even upper middle-income countries. The latter are also known as top 
destinations for CDM projects, and hence the generation of CERs. However, when looking into the 
relevant disbursements more closely, we find that all but the funding for South Africa is forestry 
related. This type of projects obviously follows a different logic than other mitigation activities: only 
afforestation and reforestation projects (not avoided deforestation and improved forest 
management) are included in the CDM and can only generate CERs that have an expiration date. 
Moreover, the mitigation opportunities provided by forestry projects do not depend on the level of 
economic development and industrialization of the host country. Hence, for mitigation activities 
related to forestry, poor countries can also be very efficient locations, and the income level does not 
really matter. 
Overall, regarding mitigation, the limited evidence available to us thus suggests that trust fund 
resources are allocated relatively efficiently, and that this does not only hold for carbon funds 
where investments can be driven by direct financial incentives, but also for other mitigation trust 
funds. 
For adaptation funds, the results are more puzzling. While Table 5 again shows a high 
negative coefficient for GDP per capita when looking at all relevant disbursements, the effect is in 
no way stronger for adaptation funds than for mitigation funds. As opposed to mitigation, locality 
matters strongly for adaptation, and support should thus be given in line with financial needs and 
other vulnerabilities. Just as we observe for bilateral donors, one would thus expect to see a 
stronger negative correlation between funding and per capita income for adaptation than for 
mitigation activities. In contrast, for those trust funds that are highly relevant for adaptation, the 
coefficient for GDP per capita becomes generally positive, and even significantly so in Regression 2. 
At first glance, these results seem to contradict the results of Table 3, which showed that almost one 
third of the MDBs’ adaptation trusts focused on IDA eligible recipients. Yet, this still leaves another 
two thirds of adaptation funds with global or regional focus that may predominantly cater for 
wealthier countries. Furthermore, while adaptation funds with a focus on IDA-eligible countries are 
relatively numerous, they seem to be quite small, so that other funds dominate in terms of 
disbursements. 
Besides these somewhat unsettling results about the lack of poverty orientation, we find that 
the indicators directly measuring climate change vulnerability are mostly insignificant (except for 
Regression 10). The indicators shown in Table 5 are the standard Notre Dame country index (ND-
GAIN), combining the dimensions “vulnerability” and “readiness” (the higher, the less vulnerable 
and/or better prepared for adaptation), and the share of land below an elevation of 5m (to 
separately capture some physical vulnerability). Alternative indicators, such as the population, 
share below an elevation of 5m, agricultural value added (as a proxy of the share of the economy 
directly dependent on climatic factors) and the vulnerability sub-index of ND-GAIN have also been 
tested and yielded no significant results either (not shown). 
In contrast, for bilateral aid, ND-GAIN is clearly significant. However, the positive coefficient 
suggests that donors allocate more ODA to those countries that are less vulnerable or already better 
prepared to face climate change. When breaking up ND-GAIN into its two main components, it 
becomes clear that the effect is driven by the readiness component. This component is supposed to 
capture the economic, institutional and social conditions that make a country attractive for external 
funding. The strongly positive coefficient simply confirms this attractiveness for foreign aid. In the 
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way it is measured, it is linked to well-known factors of bilateral donor-interest, namely access to an 
interesting market and promising investment opportunities. All indicators related to vulnerability 
itself are insignificant for bilateral donors. 
The CER variable should, in principle, have no role to play for the allocation of adaptation 
funding, but we add it for comparison with Table 4. Intriguingly, we do find a strong relationship 
with trust fund disbursements. While we find a significant effect for bilateral ODA as well, this can 
be explained more easily, as it could also capture some dimensions of bilateral donors’ interest in 
cooperation, with countries that are interesting partners for trade and investment. These variables 
are not only correlated with the ND-GAIN readiness component, but also with opportunities for the 
CDM. However, what drives the preference of World Bank adaptation trust funds to invest in these 
countries? 
In any case, it seems that the World Bank trust fund allocation decisions for mitigation and 
adaptation funds are all too similar, suggesting that there could be substantial efficiency gains for 
adaptation funds if they allocated their resources much more clearly according to need. The same is 
partially true for bilateral ODA, but there at least, we see some more appropriate differentiation 
between adaptation and mitigation finance, with a clear focus on poverty in the area of adaptation. 
It is also striking that World Bank trust funds with high relevance for adaptation seem to focus 
on recipients that are already quite well governed. If the Bank’s trust funds were complementary to 
other funding by focusing more strongly on capacity building activities, why would they do this in 
countries where capacity is already high? Assuming decreasing marginal benefits of such a support, 
government enabling activities should be most efficient where existing capacity is low. However, it 
remains to be seen how strongly the trust funds of the World Bank, and of MDBs more generally, 
are really involved in capacity building activities. 
3.3. Focus on Capacity Building 
To identify whether the activities of a trust fund focus on capacity building, we again examine the 
data, both at trust fund level and with respect to individual disbursements. At trust fund level, we 
went through the individual trust fund names in our database and carried out an additional web 
search about their activities in case the names were not sufficiently clear. Table 6 shows those trust 
funds for which we identified a focus on capacity building based on this analysis, along with their 
geographic and thematic orientation, the responsible organization and their period of activity (as 
far as available). 
Table 6. Trust funds with capacity building focus. 
Trust Fund Name 
Responsible 
Organization 
Geographic 
Orientation 
Thematic 
Orientation 
Period of 
Activity 
Ireland Trust Fund for Building Climate Change and 
Disaster Resilience in Small Island Developing States 
ADB regional Adaptation 2019–2024 
Africa Carbon Support Program AfDB regional Mitigation n.a. 
NDC Pipeline Accelerator IADB regional Mitigation 2017 
Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency Fund FIF global Mitigation 2016–2024 
BioCFplus Technical Assistance and Capacity Building 
Fund 
WBG global Mitigation 2015–2020 
Biocarbon Technical Assistance Trust Fund WBG global Mitigation 2003–2020 
Carbon Finance Assist Trust Fund WBG global Mitigation 2016–2019 
Carbon Initiative for Development Readiness Fund WBG global Mitigation 2013–2025 
Climate Change Advisory Services relating to the Facility 
for Sustainable Business Advisory Services (SBAS) 
WBG global 
Climate 
change 
general 
n.a. 
Geothermal Development in Indonesia: Technical 
Assistance for Capacity Building Trust Fund 
WBG 
IBRD 
recipients 
Mitigation 2011–2017 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Economics of Adaptation to 
Climate Change 
WBG global Adaptation 2009–2010 
Nationally Determined Contributions Support Facility WBG global Mitigation 2016–2019 
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Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR) Multi Donor 
Trust Fund 
WBG global Mitigation 2011–2021 
Readiness Fund of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility  WBG global Mitigation 2008–2021 
Readiness Fund of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility  WBG global Mitigation 2017–2021 
Renewable Energy Advisory Services Program for Africa WBG regional Mitigation n.a. 
We found 16 such funds, mostly run by the World Bank, but also one by each of the regional 
development banks that we cover, and one FIF in which several MDBs are involved. Most of the 
capacity building effort seems to be directed towards mitigation, often related to carbon market 
activities. As this is the area with the greatest risk that the World Bank could directly crowd out 
private market activities, a strong focus on an enabling role in this area is a positive sign—unless 
these enabling activities focus mainly on enabling the Bank’s own market transactions. This could 
be checked by comparing the geographic allocation of resources by carbon funds with the 
geographic allocation of capacity building activities. Unfortunately, the information on geographic 
allocation is available for neither of the two. 
Generally, there is little we can learn about which countries receive support from MDB trust 
funds focusing on capacity building, not even in terms of their income category. Most of the funds 
in Table 6 are active globally or regionally. None of them specializes specifically on IDA recipients. 
Hence, a specific focus of the trust funds’ carbon market activities on capacity building in poor 
countries does not appear to be very plausible. 
At the level of disbursements, due to the restricted information available to us, we cannot 
analyze carbon funds any further. In fact, among all the trust funds in Table 6, we have 
disbursement information only for one (Geothermal Development in Indonesia: Technical 
Assistance for Capacity Building Geothermal Development in Indonesia). This is because many of 
them are Bank executed trust funds that are not covered by the disbursement dataset. 
Of course, other funds—even if not dedicated to capacity building only—may also spend 
significant amounts on this topic. We thus examine the sector identifiers for trust fund 
disbursements for those funds for which disbursement information is available. The sector name 
that seems to fit best is “Institutional strengthening and capacity building”, but it has zero positive 
entries in the database (even for the fund clearly identified as capacity building). We thus focus on 
other sectors that appear close to what we wish to capture, namely support to public 
administration, to central government and to sub-national government. For each entry in the 
disbursement database, we build an indicator that sums up the share of disbursements to these 
capacity-related subsectors. Figure 2 plots this indicator against the per capita income of the 
recipient. 
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Figure 2. The share of capacity building disbursements by recipient income. Note: Each dot 
corresponds to one disbursement from the World Bank’s trust fund disbursement database  
(for all climate trust funds included in the database). 
It is obvious from the figure that there is no clear relationship between GDP per capita and 
capacity building disbursements. High shares of disbursements (up to 100%) flow into support for 
public administration, central or sub-national government, even in countries with a per capita 
income of 20,000 USD. Clearly, the World Bank’s climate trust funds do not specifically focus these 
support activities on poor countries. 
4. Discussion 
Do MDB trust funds do what they should? Using disbursements of climate-related trust funds at 
the World Bank, the above analysis leaves us with a puzzle: while mitigation trust funds seem to 
focus on countries with large mitigation opportunities, as they should in order to be efficient, 
adaptation trust funds show a similar pattern. This is problematic, as efficient adaptation measures 
should focus on the most vulnerable countries that lack capacity to adjust their economy to climate 
change. The problem is similar for bilateral ODA, although, at least in terms of the consideration of 
recipient income, the important differentiation between adaptation and mitigation finance is more 
marked than for World Bank trust funds. Bilateral adaptation finance clearly prioritizes poor 
countries. This is not evident at all for the trust funds of the World Bank. This leaves us with the 
impression that World Bank trust funds, rather than to take a strategic decision for an efficiency-
oriented allocation of resources for mitigation as a global public good, indiscriminately favor 
spending in more advanced economies. 
We cannot discern any strategic choice of capacity building activities either. Disbursements for 
such activities do not seem to be linked to financial needs, as measured by GDP per capita. We do 
see that many trust funds clearly devoted to capacity building activities are active in the area of 
carbon markets, which may point at a useful complementarity between Word Bank activities in this 
area and the activities of the private sector. Yet, they may as well be a useful complement to the 
World Bank’s own financial transactions on this market, effectively cross-subsidizing its carbon 
market transactions. As long as disbursement data for carbon funds are kept secret, this suspicion 
cannot be rejected. 
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5. Conclusions 
Based on the best available dataset on MDB climate trust funds, this paper examined the efficiency 
of their resource allocation and their possible complementarities to other types of public and 
private funding. The results are rather sobering. In contrast to bilateral aid, the adaptation finance 
of these trust funds does not seem to give any priority to countries most strongly in need. In a 
certain way, this could be seen as a complementarity, but clearly not as one that appears useful 
from an efficiency perspective. 
While efficiency orientation would have suggested major differences, the mitigation finance of 
MDB trust funds seems to focus on a very similar type of countries. A priori, for mitigation, a lesser 
need-orientation makes sense, because the benefits of mitigation—as a global public good—are not 
linked to the locality of project implementation. However, in this area, the MDBs’ activities may 
crowd out the private sector. This is particularly relevant for carbon finance, where the MBDs’ trust 
funds are active on the same market as project developers, and buyers and sellers of emission 
credits, alongside with multiple private banks and consultancy firms. To be complementary to these 
activities, the MDBs need to focus on the function of an enabler or catalyzer [26] for private 
investment. The relatively large number of carbon trust funds focusing on capacity building could 
be a positive signal in this direction, enhancing readiness for climate change mitigation beyond 
specific carbon market transactions. Yet, as long as there are no data to examine who benefits from 
these capacity building efforts, some doubt remains. In fact, these funds may just as well promote 
the MDBs’ own carbon market transactions. 
The missing disbursement information for carbon funds is not the only area where lack of data 
seriously hampers our analysis. MDBs other than the World Bank did not make any disbursement 
information available to us. Within World Bank data, beyond the carbon funds, we lack not only the 
details for IFC trust funds (which may be understandable as the IFC funds private-sector 
transactions), but also the information on Bank executed trust funds. In addition, sector codes are 
not easy to interpret without further guidance, because different classification systems are used in 
parallel. 
Despite all these problems, the information we collected—supported by a major bilateral 
donor agency that is itself member of multiple MDB trust funds—is still much more comprehensive 
than the information available to the public. This lack of transparency represents a major barrier to 
accountability. Moreover, it seems to be at odds with the official transparency policies of 
multilateral agencies such as the World Bank see [42]. 
Given the financial weight that trust funds have gained during the last two decades, the lack of 
transparency is also problematic for the accountability of development finance more broadly. While 
individual donors are requested to report their bilateral ODA in detail to the OECD/DAC, funding 
channeled through trust funds vanishes in a black hole. Hence, donor countries have two options 
how to fund the same purpose and partner country—one is transparent, while the other is not. In 
principle, trust funds provide an opportunity to donors to hide all those transactions that might be 
less appreciated by their citizens. These could, for instance, be financial contributions to countries 
that are important for commercial or geopolitical reasons, but less so from an adaptation or from a 
general development perspective. If donors use trust funds in this way, then transparency over the 
remaining ODA becomes less meaningful, too. In fact, a bilateral donor might be able to show a 
perfectly need-oriented aid portfolio in the DAC statistics, just because it channels all of its less 
perfect financial flows through MDB trust funds. (For a more general discussion of the “dirty work 
hypothesis”, see [43,44].) To avoid such obfuscation, the financial flows of these trust funds should 
be fully publicly accessible and reported in the same way as bilateral ODA. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Variable description and data sources (panel data). 
Variable Obs MeanStd. Min Max Description Source 
TF-disb.      ln (1+trust fund disbursements in const. 2015 US$) for   
Mitigation, high relevance 1773 0.13 1.35 0.00 15.82 trust funds for which mitigation is highly relevant 
World Bank trust fund 
disbursement database 
(unpublished) 
Mitigation, all 1773 0.57 2.69 0.00 16.23 all mitigation trust funds, high and medium relevance 
Adaptation, high relevance1773 0.54 2.66 0.00 16.76 trust funds for which adaptation is highly relevant 
Adaptation, all 1773 1.43 4.08 0.00 16.76 all adaptation trust funds, high and medium relevance 
ODA      
ln (1+official development assistance in const. 2017 US$, commitments) for 
projects, for which 
 
Mitigation, principal 1639 11.72 6.48 0.00 21.89 mitigation is the principal objective 
[45] 
Mitigation, all 1639 14.40 5.24 0.00 21.94 mitigation is the principal or a significant objective 
Adaptation, principal 1194 11.75 6.23 0.00 20.01 adaptation is the principal objective 
Adaptation, all 1192 14.93 4.95 0.00 20.85 adaptation is the principal or a significant objective 
Recipient characteristics        
GDP per capita 1570 8.72 0.98 6.43 10.83 ln (GDP per capita, PPP, const. 2011 intl. $) 
[46] Population 1633 15.48 2.25 9.19 21.05 ln (population) 
Land below 5m 1331 4.18 9.90 0.00 55.88 Land area below an elevation of 5m above sea level 
ND-GAIN 1518 43.15 8.27 15.9362.18
Country index combining vulnerability and readiness (the higher, the lower 
is the vulnerability and/or the higher is the readiness) 
[47] 
CERs 1639 6.29 6.68 0.00 20.19
Certified emission reductions (in tCO2e) projected to be generated within 
year from registered CDM projects 
[22] 
Gov. effectiveness 1601 −0.48 0.69 −2.48 1.57 
Government effectiveness (composite indicator: the higher, the more 
effective) 
[48] 
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